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Abstract
In the paper we analyse dependence structures among international trade flows of ma-
jor conventional weapons from 1952 to 2016. We employ a Network Disturbance Model
commonly used in inferential network analysis and spatial econometrics. The depen-
dence structure is represented by pre-defined weight matrices that allow for relating
the arms trade flows from the network of international arms exchange. Several dif-
ferent weight matrices are compared by means of the AIC in order to select the best
dependence structure. It turns out that the dependence structure among the arms
trade flows is rather complex and can be represented by a specification that, simply
speaking, relates each arms trade flow to all exports and imports of the sending and
the receiving state. By controlling for explanatory variables we are able to show the
influence of political and economic variables on the volume traded.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate international trade flows of Major Conventional Weapons (MCW)
using data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). MCW
include armoured vehicles, aircrafts, naval vessels etc. and SIPRI has collected all interna-
tional arms transfers from 1950 to 2016 in a comprehensive database. The database includes
information on the sending and the receiving country as well as the volume of the trades
in a certain year. The volume is measured in so called TIV, shorthand for trend-indicator
value(s), and represents the value of military resources that are exported. The data can be
regarded as a year wise sequence of weighted networks where the countries are the nodes
and the arms trade flows among them are the valued edges.
Several scholars have started to investigate arms trade using a network framework, but
the available studies were restricted to binary relations, i.e. trade or no trade, see for example
Willardson (2013), Akerman and Seim (2014), Kinne (2016) and Thurner et al. (2018). The
central workhorse in inferential binary network analysis is thereby the Exponential Random
Graph Model (ERGM), as introduced by Holland and Leinhardt (1981) (see also Frank and
Strauss, 1986, Kolaczyk, 2009 and Lusher et al., 2012). Recent proposals for modelling
valued networks within the ERGM class are provided by Krivitsky (2012) or the Generalized
Exponential Random Graph Model (GERGM) by Desmarais and Cranmer (2012). The first
model allows for discrete valued counts while in the GERGM the weights on the edges are
transformed into interval data between zero and one. Both approaches are not suitable for
modelling of arms trade data because the TIV is continuous and zero inflated (i.e. TIV= 0
stands for no trade). Nonetheless, the binary analysis, i.e. trade or no trade, is central, since
trading of arms implies governmental agreement and contracts and therefore represents direct
and indirect trust relations, regardless of the amount of trading (see e.g. Jackson, 2010).
In this paper, however, we focus on the amount of trading (if there is trading). Of
particular interest is thereby the dependence structure of trading amounts, that is how is
the trading amount of a country (to a country) influenced by other trading amounts. In order
to do so, we change the viewpoint of the network and go from a representation with the nodes
as countries and the edges being arms trade flows to a network where the nodes are the trade
flows between two countries and the edges represent the dependencies among them. This
yields a model that at least conceptually resembles models from spatial econometrics (see
e.g. LeSage and Pace, 2009 and Kauermann et al., 2012). This model class was developed
for capturing spatial effects and spillovers from nearby sites and can be transformed to
model the dependence of similar arms trade flows. Models from spatial econometrics even
have their own name in the social network methodology and are commonly called Network
Autocorrelation Models (see for example Leenders, 2002 and Hays et al., 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a short description of the data,
then in Section 3 we introduce our model and give different specifications and explanations
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Figure 1: Development of exported TIV for 1950-2016 for the United States, Soviet Union,
Russia and all other Countries.
for possible dependence structures. In Section 4 we present the results of our analysis.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Data description
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is a unique data source on
the international transfers of major conventional weapons. It covers more than 200 countries
for the time period from 1950-2016 and includes information on the sending country, the
receiving country as well as the type of MCW that is traded. Table 2 in Annex A.1 gives
an overview of weapon systems included. SIPRI has developed a measure that represents
arms trade flows as so called trend indicator values (TIV), based on production costs. The
advantage of this measure is consistency over time and comparability of different arms sys-
tems. For detailed explanation of the data and methodology see SIPRI (2017b) or Holtom
et al. (2012). The database can be accessed free of charge online at SIPRI (2017a).
In Figure 1 the development of the aggregated TIV for the time period from 1950 to 2016
is shown for the two most important exporters United States and the Soviet Union (Russia
since 1992). In Figure 2 a log-log plot of the outdegree and the aggregated export volume on
the left and the indegree and the aggregated import volume on the right is given. The solid
line in the middle gives the mean of exports or imports that is associated with the respective
in- or outdegree, the whiskers indicate the maximum and the minimum value observed. In
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Figure 2: Log-Log Plot of TIV Export vs. Outdegree (left) and TIV Import vs. Indegree
(right). Whiskers indicate minimum and maximum Values.
terms of the slope and range it can be seen that the connection between aggregated export
volume and the outdegree is somewhat stronger than the connection between import volume
and indegree. Nevertheless, both volumes increase on average in the degree.
3. Model
3.1. Definitions and Basic Formulation
In T time periods, we observe nt flows Yt = {Yt,ij : Yt,ij > 0, i, j = 1, ...., Nt} where Yt,ij is
the valued arms trade flow from country i to country j among the Nt countries that exist
in t = 1, ..., T . In the following, we suppress the time index t for ease of the notation. Let
V = {(i, j) : Yij > 0} be the (directed) index set for all country pairs (i, j) where valued
trade flows exists so that Y = {Yv : v ∈ V }. Let Y be of dimension n = |V | and numerate
the elements in V so that V = {v1, ..., vn}.
As a tool to analyse the dependence structure amongst Y we are using a graph G con-
sisting of nodes and edges, where we take V as node set and define E as symmetric edge set:
G = (V,E). We define the neighbourhood in the model through
N (va) := {vb : {va, vb} ∈ E}, a = 1, ..., n.
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The information given in the neighbourhood can be summarized in a (n × n) matrix W.
Typically the rows of the matrix are normalized such that they sum up to one by defining
Wab = |N (va)|−1 if vb ∈ N (va) and zero otherwise. This is also the definition we are using. As
we are interested in the dependencies among arms trade flows we will henceforth attach the
name tradecorrelation to the concept of related (neighbouring) flows. The intention of the
subsequent analysis is to find a reasonable weight matrix W, which defines an appropriate
dependence structure.
3.2. Regression Model
Arms trade flows are non-negative, leading us to consider a multiplicative model of the form
log(Y ) = xTβ + u
(u1, ..., un)
T = u ∼ Nn(0,Σ).
(1)
Here x represents a vector of some covariates, β gives the parameter vector and u is the error
term. The residuals u are assumed to be correlated and Σ provides the variance-covariance
matrix encoding the relation of different arms trade flows. Suitable candidates for estimation
of (1) are models from spatial econometrics or spatial statistics, respectively. We will employ
the former. Spatial econometric models are common in network analysis, see for instance
Leenders (2002), Leifeld et al. (2016), Hays et al. (2010), Metz and Ingold (2017), Silk et al.
(2017) and Ba (2017). We follow a Spatial Error Model (SEM, see LeSage and Pace, 2009)
which is given by defining the error term u as
u = ρWu + ,
 ∼ Nn(0, σ2In),
(2)
where In is the identity matrix of dimension n and ρ provides a measure for the dependency
among the related error terms u. The error terms  are assumed to be unstructured so that
equation (2) can be reformulated to
u = (In − ρW)−1. (3)
This implies the covariance matrix Σ = σ2(In − ρW)−1(In − ρWT)−1. Hence, matrix W
expresses the dependence structure and the explicit choice of W is the central model selec-
tion task that will be discussed in Section 3.3. The modelling approach is also known as
Network Disturbance Model (NDM) in the network literature, delegating the dependencies
among trade flows into the error term. Hence, the approach does not aim to model a direct
dependence between the trade flows but implies that the exogenous covariates determine the
”right” value for an arms trade flow, but one can find clusters of trade flows where the resid-
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Figure 3: Directed valued Network of Arms Trade in 1952. Edges (Nodes) are scaled pro-
portional to the logarithmic Exports (logarithmic aggregated Exports) measured in TIV.
uals are unusually high or low (see Leenders, 2002 and Freeman, 2017 for further discussion).
We sketch some details on estimation and software in the Annex A.2.
3.3. Specifications of the Weight Matrix
We now focus on the central modelling task which is the appropriate specification of matrix
W and hence the definition of the neighbourhood N . We thereby focus on interpretable
structures. Given that in the network context the weight matrices are rather abstract, we
illustrate our approach with the arms trade network of the year 1952, being the simplest
network under study. The network is shown in Figure 3. Note that all following illustrations
of weight matrices W have their origin in the network shown in Figure 3 and are therefore
not representative for other years. Still, they allow to visually understand the dependence
structure.
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Figure 4: Tradecorrelation Structure 1. Colouring according to logarithmic TIV, ranging
from Yellow (low) to Red (high).
Tradecorrelation 1 (attached to the Sending Country)
The first dependence structure relates an arms trade flow from country i to country j to all
other exports going out of country i and a possible reciprocal trade flow (j, i). Notationally
this means
N1((i, j)) = {(p, q) : p = i ∨ (p, q) = (j, i), (p, q) ∈ V }.
The corresponding graph representation for the year 1952 is shown in Figure 4. The trade
flows are grouped within clusters that are related to single exporting countries, most notably,
the trade clusters of the big exporters: United States (USA), United Kingdom (GBR),
Canada (CAN) and the Soviet Union (SUN). Via the dependence on reciprocal flows, the
clusters are connected among each other if there is between-cluster trade. This explains
the connection between the cluster of the United States (USA), Great Britain (GBR) and
Canada (CAN). The trade activity of the Soviet Union (SUN), however, is disconnected.
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Figure 5: Tradecorrelation Structure 2. Colouring according to logarithmic TIV values,
ranging from Yellow (low) to Red (high).
Tradecorrelation 2 (attached to the Receiving Country)
The concept from above can be amended such that the tradecorrelation of an arms trade is
related to the trades of the importing country and not the exporting one. This means
N2((i, j)) = {(p, q) : (p, q) = (j, i) ∨ q = j, (p, q) ∈ V }
and implies that the arms trade amount from i to j is correlated with other imports of
j as well as the potential reciprocal trade flow (j, i). This is visualized in Figure 5. The
resulting graph representation is very different from the previous one. There is no tendency
of strong clustering as most importing countries do only have one or two suppliers and
no exports at all which excludes connections via reciprocal flows. The greatest clusters
consist of arms exports to Israel (ISR) and imports of Switzerland (CHE). Great Britain
(GBR), United States (USA) and Canada (CAN) show their strong connections in arms
trade by representing their own import-related cluster. Note that this structure disregards an
important characteristic of the arms trade network: Receiving countries are often restricted
to be dependent on one single exporter. Most important, trade flows of the Soviet Union
(SUN) are missing.
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Figure 6: Tradecorrelation Structure 3. Colouring according to logarithmic TIV, ranging
from Yellow (low) to Red (high).
Tradecorrelation 3 (attached to the Trade Activity of Sender and Receiver)
The structure of tradecorrelation 1 and 2 can be combined by the inclusion of the whole
trade activity of i and j, that is
N3((i, j)) = {(p, q) : p ∈ {i, j} ∨ q ∈ {i, j}, (p, q) ∈ V }.
In this case an arms trade from country i to country j is dependent on the whole trade
activity of countries i and j, regardless whether they are reciprocal or not. This results in a
very dense graphical representation, as shown in Figure 6. Here, the clusters are again very
clearly visible but the interconnection within and between clusters is much stronger. Central
are the trade flows United States (USA) - Great Britain (GBR) and Great Britain (GBR) -
United States (USA) as they link the two countries with the most trade activity. The flows
related to Switzerland (CHE) serve as a bridge between the clusters around the western
producers and the Soviet Union (SUN). With this specification the graph is connected and
in principle each trade flow is allowed to be correlated with an arbitrary other arms trade
flow.
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Figure 7: Tradecorrelation Structure 4. Colouring according to logarithmic TIV, ranging
from Yellow (low) to Red (high).
Tradecorrelation 4 (related to Defence Agreements)
It can be discussed whether arms exchange is related to military alliances as they might agree
to build up comparable military strength which potentially leads to correlated imports. The
Correlates of War Project (2017a) provides data on formal alliances. We define a structure
that relates the imports of country j to imports of its allies. Let da(j, i) = da(i, j) be an
indicator that is one if countries i and j have a formal alliance. Then we define
N4,import((i, j)) = {(p, q) : da(j, q) = 1, (p, q) ∈ V }.
This assumption imposes a structure where importers regard the arms imports of their allies
when buying arms. In the corresponding plot in Figure 7 the trade clusters are not any
longer attached to the sending countries but are rather clustered among countries that are
connected in the alliances network. We see that the United States (USA), United Kingdom
(GBR) and Canada (CAN) represent a (bipartite) cluster with their closest allies while the
arms trade activity of the Soviet Union (SUN) forms a disconnected cluster. With this
structure we additionally see a cluster containing the alliances of Canada (CAN), United
Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA) together with countries from the Middle
East. Naturally it is also possible to relate the exports of sending countries that have an
alliance, resulting in
N4,export((i, j)) = {(p, q) : da(i, p) = 1, (p, q) ∈ V }.
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Figure 8: Tradecorrelation Structure 5. Colouring according to logarithmic TIV, ranging
from Yellow (low) to Red (high).
Tradecorrelation 5 (related to Spatial Distance)
Using data provided by Gleditsch (2013a) we can incorporate spatial distances in the cor-
relation structure. We assume that arms imports into spatially close areas are correlated
and define d(i, j) = d(j, i) as the distance between the two capital cities of i and j. With c
representing a threshold we define
N5,import((i, j)) = {(p, q) : j 6= q ∧ d(j, q) < c, (p, q) ∈ V }.
Setting c = 1 100 km leads to spatially related trade activity clusters as shown in Figure
8, where in middle a cluster of tradeflows starts with countries from western Europe and
relates them over eastern Europe to the Middle East. The choice of c is discussed in the
Annex A.3. Note that it is also possible to relate flows of spatially close exporters, that is
N5,export((i, j)) = {(p, q) : i 6= p ∧ d(i, p) < c, (p, q) ∈ V }.
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3.4. Exogenous Covariates
We control for the influence from economics and politics by including additional covariates
in model (1). Since there is an average time lag of roughly two years between ordering and
delivering of weapons and some covariates are only available from 1950 on, the first network
under study is the one of 1952 and covariates are lagged by two years.
Economic Quantities: The standard measure for economic size is the gross domestic product
(GDP). We include this measure in logarithmic form for the sender as well as the receiver.
The real GDP data is measured in thousands USD and are taken from Gleditsch (2013b).
The data are merged from the year 2011 on with recent real GDP data from the World Bank
real GDP dataset (see World Bank, 2017). It seems plausible that the military expenditures
of the receiving countries are relevant. The data is available from Correlates of War Project
(2017b) with Singer et al. (1972) as the basic reference for the data. As the time series for
military expenditure ends in 2012 we have to assume that the values stay constant until
2014.
Political Quantities: We use a dummy variable being one if the countries i and j have a
formal alliance and zero otherwise. Given the restriction that the data is available only until
2012 (Correlates of War Project (2017a) for the most recent version of the data and Gibler
(2009) for the article of record for the data set) we assume that the alliances did not change
between 2012 and 2015. In order to control for regime dissimilarity, we include the absolute
difference of the so called polity score, ranging from the spectrum −10 (hereditary monarchy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy). The data can be downloaded as annual time-series. See
Marshall (2017) for the data and basic reference.
4. Results
4.1. Model Selection
Our ultimate goal is to select a suitable dependence model from above. As recommended by
Leenders (2002) for this model class with several candidate weight matrices, we compare the
proposed models using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (see for example Claeskens
and Hjort, 2008). For comparison we also include a simple linear model with unstructured
error term (OLS, ρ = 0). Estimation is done year wise and the AIC is calculated for all
estimated models from 1952 to 2016, all in all covering 18 964 observations. In Table 1
the results for the aggregated AIC, rescaled by the lowest one (∆i =AICi−AICmin) are
presented. AICmin corresponds to tradecorrelation structure 3. In order to investigate the
different models more in detail, we also look at year wise AIC values. To do so, we compute
Akaike weights, which can be interpreted as the probability of model i being the best (i.e.
minimizing the Kullback-Leibler Divergence given the data) among the proposed ones. The
12
N1 N2 N3 N4,import N4,export N5,import N5,export ρ = 0
∆i 179.1 905.6 0.0 690.7 354.1 816.6 954.6 940.6
Table 1: Difference between aggregated AIC Values and the minimum aggregated AIC Value
for different Tradecorrelation Structures.
weights are given by wi = exp(−∆i/2)/(
∑R
r=1 exp(−∆r/2)) (see Burnham and Anderson,
2004 for a further discussion). The weights are shown in Figure 9 for all eight specifications.
We see that the specification where ρ is restricted to zero (OLS) is among those models
that have a low probability of being the best one. Only in the years 1990-2000 the probability
for this model rises slightly as a consequence of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Overall,
this provides evidence for our initial hypothesis that the trade flows are indeed correlated.
Specification N5,export (dependency of exports from spatially close countries), shows al-
most identical Akaike weights as the OLS specification. A plausible result, given that the
capital cities of the big exporters United States and Soviet Union/Russia do not have nearby
capital cities of other strong arms exporters and hence the greatest share of trade flows is
restricted to be uncorrelated. This stands in contrast to N5,import (dependency of imports of
spatially close countries) that shows up to be among the better models in the beginning of
the observational period and after 1989. Hence, this indicates that arms imports into spa-
tially near countries are indeed related to some extent after 1989, which may be interpreted
as a spatial clustering of arms imports.
While in tradecorrelation structure 5, the importer related assumption (N5,import) gives
the higher probability to be the best one as compared to the exporter related assumption
(N5,export), the opposite is the case for tradecorrelation structure 4, that is related to formal
alliances. Here the model that assumes dependency of arms trade flows of allied exporting
countries (N4,export) performs better than the one that relates those of allied importing
countries (N4,import). This leads to the presumption that formal alliances mostly consist of
partners with rather similar possibilities to export arms, i.e. either high ones, which leads to
exports with high residuals or low ones, leading to exports with low residuals. The importers
that are connected via formal alliances, seem to be more heterogeneous with respect to the
height of their imports.
For the tradecorrelation structure 2 (N2, relating the imports and a potential recipro-
cal arms trade flow), we find a similar behaviour as for OLS and N5,export. Leading to
the conclusion that there is no strong evidence that the importing arms flows are strongly
correlated.
The two specifications that compete about being the best model are tradecorrelations
N1 and N3. They alternate in being the best model in most time points. Mostly if the
13
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Figure 9: Year wise Akaike Weights for different Specifications (Raw Values in Gray,
Smoothed in Black).
probability of the model with tradecorrelation N1 decreases, the one with tradecorrelation
N3 increases and vice versa. But from a global perspective it is tradecorrelation N3 that
provides the best model, which leads to the conclusion that a single arms trade flow is related
to the whole trade activity of the sender as well as the receiver.
We infer that the exchange of international arms leads to a rather complex dependence
structure. This shows that, similar to the binary analysis, the assumption of independent
14
observations, given the covariates, is a strong simplification of the real process. Given this
result we further analyse the model with tradecorrelation structure N3.
4.2. Coefficients
Tradecorrelation: The top left panel of Figure 10 shows the trade correlation coefficient using
the structure N3. The coefficient is consistently positive but exhibits some variation. The
strongest downward movement can be found in the years 1990 - 1996, showing how massively
the end of the cold war altered the structure of the international trade of arms. From 1996
on, the coefficient increases again. In the most recent years the tradecorrelation fluctuates
around 0.6, close to the values before 1990.
Economic Quantities: The coefficient on the logarithmic GDP of the sender is, with the
exception of the year 1952, consistently positive and significant, showing a slight tendency
to decrease with time. This can be seen from Figure 10, left panel, middle plot and reflects
the fact that mostly wealthy countries have a highly developed arms industry which are able
to produce and export expensive military equipment. The slight decrease of the coefficient is
probably related to the increase of exporting countries that have smaller economic size. When
it comes to the GDP of the receiver (left panel, bottom plot), we see a more pronounced
downward trend of the coefficients. It is interesting to observe that from 1994 on, the
coefficient becomes permanently insignificant. All in all there is no strong evidence that the
TIV of arms imports is strongly influenced by the GDP of the receiving country since the 90s.
It is, however influenced by the logarithm of military expenditure of the respective country
as can be seen in the bottom plot of the right panel. There the coefficient on the logarithmic
military expenditures is almost always positive since 1967 and mostly significant from 1990
on. This indicates a change in the arms trading mechanism. Before the end of the cold war,
high arms trade flows went to countries with big economic size and after that, high flows are
directed more strongly towards countries with high spending for military equipment.
Political Quantities: Before 1990, having an alliance (right panel, top plot) in tendency
increased the amount of arms trading but at least since 1990 this effect is almost zero. The
coefficient on the absolute differences of the polity score (right panel, middle plot) shows a
time related trend. In the beginning (1953-1973) the coefficient is rather less than zero, giving
the intuitive result that differences in political regimes reduce the amount of arms traded.
From 1976 until 1991 the coefficient can be regarded as zero, which mirrors the fact that at
the height of the cold war the belonging to a political bloc was more important then distances
in the polity scores. After the end of the Soviet Union, the coefficient remained close to zero
until 2011 where the coefficients becomes significantly positive for six consecutive years,
providing the surprising result that differences in the polity score do not lead to a reduction
of the traded amount of arms.
15
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Figure 10: Time Series of Coefficients from the Model with Tradecorrelation Structure 3.
p-values by colours (green p < 0.05, orange p < 0.1, red p > 0.1). Shaded Regions give ± 2
standard deviations.
4.3. Residual Analysis
We give a graphical summary in Figure 11 for the pooled unstructured estimated residuals
ˆ. The plot on the left gives a QQ-plot with the quantiles of the standardized residuals on
the vertical axes against the quantiles from a standard normal distribution on the horizontal
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Figure 11: QQ-Plot (left) and Histogram (right) of standardized Residuals.
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Figure 12: Kernel Density Estimates of the Tradecorrelation Residuals for selected Countries
in the Time Periods 1952-1991 (left) and 1992-2016 (right).
axis. The right panel shows a histogram of the residuals together with a standard normal.
Besides some irregularities in the tails, the results look quite acceptable.
As shown in the previous section, the coefficient on the tradecorrelation is always positive
and it is therefore natural to ask whether it is possible to identify trade clusters with higher
or lower than expected trade flows. In order to do so, we attribute to each country those
elements of the vector of estimated ”tradecorrelation-residuals” (ρˆWuˆ) where the respec-
tive country is either the sender or the receiver. This is illustrated in Figure 12. For the
periods 1952-1991 (left) and 1992-2016 (right) kernel density estimates of the the estimated
”tradecorrelation-residuals” for the most important countries are given. A strong difference
in the distributions of the residuals can be found. Most notably the residuals are mostly neg-
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ative for the United States (USA), Great Britain (GBR), Germany (DEU), France (FRA),
and Canada (CAN) while the distribution for the Soviet Union (SUN) is shifted to the right
and the one of China (CHN) is somewhat in-between In the period 1992-2016, the distribu-
tions are shifted closer together but the remarkable divide between the big western exporters
and Russia (RUS) is still visible. This leads to the suggestion that the positive coefficient on
tradecorrelation is partly driven by the differences of the tradeclusters of the western world
and the one around the Soviet Union/Russia
5. Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the volume of international arms trade flows by employing a
Network Disturbance Model. Seven different dependence structures are proposed and the
best one is selected by the minimization of the AIC. Using this approach we find that a
specification that relates the error term of an arms trade flow to the whole trade activity
of the sending and receiving state works well in most years. This reveals that the network
of international arms trade imposes a very complex dependence structure among the arms
trade flows.
The analysis of the tradecorrelation coefficient shows that the correlation pattern among
the flows rather stable and breaks only for the transition period after the end of the cold war.
The development of the coefficients on the covariates shows how the influence of economic
and political factors has changed with time.
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A. Annex
A.1. Descriptives
Table 2 gives the categories of arms that are included in the analysis. All types with expla-
nations are taken from SIPRI (2017b). The 171 countries that are included in our analysis
can be found in Table 3, together with the three-digit country codes that are used to ab-
breviate countries in the paper. In addition to that, the time periods, for which we coded
the countries as existent are included. Note that the SIPRI data set contains more than 171
arms trading entities but we excluded non-states and countries with no (reliable) covariates
available. In the covariates some missings are present in the data. No time series of covari-
ates for the selected countries is completely missing (those countries are excluded from the
analysis) and the major share of them is complete but there are series with some missing
values. This is sometimes the case in the year 1990 and/or 1991 where the former socialist
countries split up or had some transition time. In other cases values at the beginning or at
the end of the series are missing. We have decided to impute the missing values via linear
interpolation, using the R package imputeTS by Moritz (2016).
I
Type Explanation
Aircraft All fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, including unmanned aircraft with
a minimum loaded weight of 20 kg. Exceptions are microlight aircraft,
powered and unpowered gliders and target drones.
Air-defence systems (a) All land-based surface-to-air missile systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft
guns with a calibre of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a
combined caliber of at least 70 mm. This includes self-propelled systems
on armoured or unarmoured chassis.
Anti-submarine warfare weapons Rocket launchers, multiple rocket launchers and mortars for use against
submarines, with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.
Armoured vehicles All vehicles with integral armour protection, including all types of tank,
tank destroyer, armoured car, armoured personnel carrier, armoured
support vehicle and infantry fighting vehicle. Vehicles with very light
armour protection (such as trucks with an integral but lightly armoured
cabin) are excluded.
Artillery Naval, fixed, self-propelled and towed guns, howitzers, multiple rocket
launchers and mortars, with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.
Engines (a) Engines for military aircraft, for example, combat-capable aircraft,
larger military transport and support aircraft, including large heli-
copters; (b) Engines for combat ships -,fast attack craft, corvettes,
frigates, destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers and submarines; (c) En-
gines for most armoured vehicles - generally engines of more than 200
horsepower output.∗
Missiles (a) All powered, guided missiles and torpedoes, and (b) all unpowered
but guided bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence sys-
tems and portable guided anti-tank missiles. Unguided rockets, free-fall
aerial munitions, anti-submarine rockets and target drones are excluded.
Sensors (a) All land-, aircraft- and ship-based active (radar) and passive (e.g.
electro-optical) surveillance systems with a range of at least 25 kilo-
metres, with the exception of navigation and weather radars, (b) all
fire-control radars, with the exception of range-only radars, and (c) anti-
submarine warfare and anti-ship sonar systems for ships and helicopters.∗
Satellites All reconnaissance and communications satellites.
Ships (a) All ships with a standard tonnage of 100 tonnes or more, and (b)
all ships armed with artillery of 100-mm calibre or more, torpedoes or
guided missiles, and (c) all ships below 100 tonnes where the maximum
speed (in kmh) multiplied with the full tonnage equals 3500 or more.
Exceptions are most survey ships, tugs and some transport ships
Other (a) All turrets for armoured vehicles fitted with a gun of at least 12.7
mm calibre or with guided anti-tank missiles, (b) all turrets for ships
fitted with a gun of at least 57-mm calibre, and (c) all turrets for ships
fitted with multiple guns with a combined calibre of at least 57 mm, and
(d) air refueling systems as used on tanker aircraft.∗
∗In cases where the system is fitted on a platform (vehicle, aircraft or ship), the database only includes those
systems that come from a different supplier from the supplier of the platform.
The Arms Transfers Database does not cover other military equipment such as small arms and light weapons
(SALW) other than portable guided missiles such as man-portable air defence systems and guided anti-tank mis-
siles. Trucks, artillery under 100-mm calibre, ammunition, support equipment and components (other than those
mentioned above), repair and support services or technology transfers are also not included in the database.
Source: SIPRI (2017b)
Table 2: Types of Weapons included in the SIPRI Arms Trade Database
II
Country Code Included Country Code Included Country Code Included
Afghanistan AFG 1950 - 2016 German Dem. Rep. GDR 1950 - 1991 Pakistan PAK 1950 - 2016
Albania ALB 1950 - 2016 Germany DEU 1950 - 2016 Panama PAN 1950 - 2016
Algeria DZA 1962 - 2016 Ghana GHA 1957 - 2016 Papua New Guin. PNG 1975 - 2016
Angola AGO 1975 - 2016 Greece GRC 1950 - 2016 Paraguay PRY 1950 - 2016
Argentina ARG 1950 - 2016 Guatemala GTM 1950 - 2016 Peru PER 1950 - 2016
Armenia ARM 1991 - 2016 Guinea GIN 1958 - 2016 Philippines PHL 1950 - 2016
Australia AUS 1950 - 2016 Guinea-Bissau GNB 1973 - 2016 Poland POL 1950 - 2016
Austria AUT 1950 - 2016 Guyana GUY 1966 - 2016 Portugal PRT 1950 - 2016
Azerbaijan AZE 1991 - 2016 Haiti HTI 1950 - 2016 Qatar QAT 1971 - 2016
Bahrain BHR 1971 - 2016 Honduras HND 1950 - 2016 Romania ROM 1950 - 2016
Bangladesh BGD 1971 - 2016 Hungary HUN 1950 - 2016 Russia RUS 1992 - 2016
Belarus BLR 1991 - 2016 India IND 1950 - 2016 Rwanda RWA 1962 - 2016
Belgium BEL 1950 - 2016 Indonesia IDN 1950 - 2016 Saudi Arabia SAU 1950 - 2016
Benin BEN 1961 - 2016 Iran IRN 1950 - 2016 Senegal SEN 1960 - 2016
Bhutan BTN 1950 - 2016 Iraq IRQ 1950 - 2016 Serbia SRB 1992 - 2016
Bolivia BOL 1950 - 2016 Ireland IRL 1950 - 2016 Sierra Leone SLE 1961 - 2016
Bosnia Herzegov. BIH 1992 - 2016 Israel ISR 1950 - 2016 Singapore SGP 1965 - 2016
Botswana BWA 1966 - 2016 Italy ITA 1950 - 2016 Slovakia SVK 1993 - 2016
Brazil BRA 1950 - 2016 Jamaica JAM 1962 - 2016 Slovenia SVN 1991 - 2016
Bulgaria BGR 1950 - 2016 Japan JPN 1950 - 2016 Solomon Islands SLB 1978 - 2016
Burkina Faso BFA 1960 - 2016 Jordan JOR 1950 - 2016 Somalia SOM 1960 - 2016
Burundi BDI 1962 - 2016 Kazakhstan KAZ 1991 - 2016 South Africa ZAF 1950 - 2016
Cambodia KHM 1953 - 2016 Kenya KEN 1963 - 2016 Soviet Union SUN 1950 - 1991
Cameroon CMR 1960 - 2016 North Korea PRK 1950 - 2016 Spain ESP 1950 - 2016
Canada CAN 1950 - 2016 South Korea KOR 1950 - 2016 Sri Lanka LKA 1950 - 2016
Cape Verde CPV 1975 - 2016 Kuwait KWT 1961 - 2016 Sudan SDN 1956 - 2016
Central Afr. Rep. CAF 1960 - 2016 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1991 - 2016 Suriname SUR 1975 - 2016
Chad TCD 1960 - 2016 Laos LAO 1950 - 2016 Swaziland SWZ 1968 - 2016
Chile CHL 1950 - 2016 Latvia LVA 1991 - 2016 Sweden SWE 1950 - 2016
China CHN 1950 - 2016 Lebanon LBN 1950 - 2016 Switzerland CHE 1950 - 2016
Colombia COL 1950 - 2016 Lesotho LSO 1966 - 2016 Syria SYR 1950 - 2016
Comoros COM 1975 - 2016 Liberia LBR 1950 - 2016 Taiwan TWN 1950 - 2016
DR Congo ZAR 1960 - 2016 Libya LBY 1951 - 2016 Tajikistan TJK 1991 - 2016
Congo COG 1960 - 2016 Lithuania LTU 1990 - 2016 Tanzania TZA 1961 - 2016
Costa Rica CRI 1950 - 2016 Luxembourg LUX 1950 - 2016 Thailand THA 1950 - 2016
Cote dIvoire CIV 1960 - 2016 Macedonia MKD 1991 - 2016 Timor-Leste TMP 2002 - 2016
Croatia HRV 1991 - 2016 Madagascar MDG 1960 - 2016 Togo TGO 1960 - 2016
Cuba CUB 1950 - 2016 Malawi MWI 1964 - 2016 Trinidad Tobago TTO 1962 - 2016
Cyprus CYP 1960 - 2016 Malaysia MYS 1957 - 2016 Tunisia TUN 1956 - 2016
Czech Republic CZR 1993 - 2016 Mali MLI 1960 - 2016 Turkey TUR 1950 - 2016
Czechoslovakia CZE 1950 - 1991 Mauritania MRT 1960 - 2016 Turkmenistan TKM 1991 - 2016
Denmark DNK 1950 - 2016 Mauritius MUS 1968 - 2016 Uganda UGA 1962 - 2016
Djibouti DJI 1977 - 2016 Mexico MEX 1950 - 2016 Ukraine UKR 1991 - 2016
Dominican Rep. DOM 1950 - 2016 Moldova MDA 1991 - 2016 Un. Arab Emirates ARE 1971 - 2016
Ecuador ECU 1950 - 2016 Mongolia MNG 1950 - 2016 United Kingdom GBR 1950 - 2016
Egypt EGY 1950 - 2016 Morocco MAR 1956 - 2016 United States USA 1950 - 2016
El Salvador SLV 1950 - 2016 Mozambique MOZ 1975 - 2016 Uruguay URY 1950 - 2016
Equatorial Guin. GNQ 1968 - 2016 Myanmar MMR 1950 - 2016 Uzbekistan UZB 1991 - 2016
Eritrea ERI 1993 - 2016 Namibia NAM 1990 - 2016 Venezuela VEN 1950 - 2016
Estonia EST 1991 - 2016 Nepal NPL 1950 - 2016 Vietnam VNM 1976 - 2016
Ethiopia ETH 1950 - 2016 Netherlands NLD 1950 - 2016 South Vietnam SVM 1950 - 1975
Fiji FJI 1970 - 2016 New Zealand NZL 1950 - 2016 Yemen YEM 1991 - 2016
Finland FIN 1950 - 2016 Nicaragua NIC 1950 - 2016 North Yemen NYE 1950 - 1991
France FRA 1950 - 2016 Niger NER 1960 - 2016 South Yemen SYE 1950 - 1991
Gabon GAB 1960 - 2016 Nigeria NGA 1960 - 2016 Yugoslavia YUG 1950 - 1992
Gambia GMB 1965 - 2016 Norway NOR 1950 - 2016 Zambia ZMB 1964 - 2016
Georgia GEO 1991 - 2016 Oman OMN 1950 - 2016 Zimbabwe ZWE 1950 - 2016
Table 3: Countries included in the Analysis with three-digit Country Codes and Time-Period
of Inclusion in the Model.
III
A.2. Technical Details on the Estimation
The estimation of the models is done in R (see R Development Core Team, 2014). For
models with one weight matrix, there is an implementation by Bivand et al. (2013) (see
also Bivand and Piras, 2015), based on a two-step method. First, the profiled likelihood
is maximized with respect to ρ, by using the simplex method of Nelder and Mead (1965).
In the second step the other parameters are found by weighted least squares. Given those
estimates, the concentrated likelihood is updated for ρ. The major computational burden
comes with the calculation of the log-determinant of (In − ρW). The problem is solved
by using the eigenvalues of W, i.e. log(|In − ρW|) =
∑n
i=1 log(1 − ρλi), with λi being the
eigenvalues of W.
Further important packages used in this paper are the igraph package by Csardi and
Nepusz (2006) as well as the statnet suite by Handcock et al. (2008) for the visualization
of networks. For the Figures and Tables the packages ggplot2 by Wickham (2016) and
stargazer by Hlavac (2013) are used.
A.3. Optimal Cutoff for the Spatial Distance
The optimal cutoff distances are found by maximization of Moran’s I (see Moran, 1950) for
the whole time period. In order to do so we construct a block-diagonal weight matrix for
all observations and time periods and calculate Moran’s I for varying threshold levels. The
distance is discretized on a grid, ranging from 0 km to 20 000 km, incrementing in steps of
100 km. The highest value for Moran’s I is found for c = 1 100 km for the weight matrix that
relates the distances of the receiver (N5,import) and c = 300 km for the weight matrix that
relates the distances of the sender (N5,export). Note that we have chosen the maximum value
in the sender-related model, although there is also a minimum value that is comparable
in absolute numbers and could be interpreted as negative spatial correlation. This value
is however realized for a cutoff value around 4 600 km which seems to be unrealistic (e.g.
the distance between Moscow and London is roughly 2 500 km). The result is visualized in
Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Moran’s I for different Threshold Levels c on a Grid. Receiver related Tradecor-
relation on the left and Sender related Tradecorrelation on the right.
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